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Prepublication Review, Retroactive
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Henry Walter†
The Constitution’s promises of freedom of speech and common defense can, at
times, be at odds. One acute example of that tension is the prepublication review
process, by which the government reviews written works by certain current and former employees to ensure that they do not contain classified or other sensitive information. While this process surely has its merits in preserving national security, it
also presents authors with a bureaucratic thicket that is often difficult to navigate.
This process is further complicated by the fact that the government can retroactively
classify documents, meaning that information that authors might have thought was
fair game is instead withdrawn from the public domain. The Supreme Court has
addressed prepublication review only once, in Snepp v. United States. There, the
Court validated the constitutionality of prepublication review but failed to articulate
its reasoning in terms of established First Amendment doctrine. This Comment clarifies the standard of review applicable to prepublication review as an articulation of
intermediate scrutiny.
Once that standard of review is established, this Comment applies it to the
prepublication review process. With regard to substance, this Comment argues that,
under intermediate scrutiny, the government does not have a sufficient national security justification to censor unclassified information during the prepublication review process. With regard to procedure, this Comment recommends that retroactive
classification decisions during the prepublication review process should be subject
to document-by-document review, that the burden-shifting framework to determine
whether information is sufficiently public should begin by placing the onus on the
government, and that authors’ legal claims arising from the process should not be
mooted by completion of the review. Taken together, these clarifications and adjustments would subtly alter incentives to ensure that the prepublication review process
equitably balances the interests of both the government and authors.
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INTRODUCTION
In the fall of 2019, John Bolton left his position as national
security advisor to President Donald Trump after about seventeen months in the role. Bolton later recounted his experiences in
his memoir, The Room Where It Happened. After acquiring a
$2 million advance and drafting a 500-plus-page manuscript, he
submitted the book to the White House for prepublication review.1
Prepublication review is the process by which government officials review some current and former employees’ writings, before
they are published, to ensure that they do not contain sensitive

1
First Amended Complaint at 1, United States v. Bolton (Bolton I), 468 F. Supp. 3d
1 (D.D.C. 2020) (order denying temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction)
(No. 20-cv-01580).
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information. The government found that Bolton’s first draft was
“rife with classified information,” and he spent the next several
months making modifications to mollify concerns.2 Due to these
efforts, the White House official reviewing Bolton’s book “communicated to Bolton that she no longer considered the manuscript to
contain classified material.”3 Despite these efforts, that informal
near-approval was later overridden by official disapproval. Bolton
went ahead with publication anyway, flouting his contractual obligations to put his book through the prepublication review process and prompting a lawsuit by the United States.4
Bolton’s experience with prepublication review was tumultuous but not unprecedented—or even uncommon.5 Another author
described his own experience with the process as “contentious,”
“fraught,” “inconsisten[t],” “lengthy,” and as inducing anxiety,
belligerence, and self-censorship.6 In one particularly pointed
email, a prepublication review official queried, “Why do you people insist on writing?”7 Nevertheless, the author said that he was
“grateful” for the process insofar as it caught sensitive information that he had not fully understood was significant.8
These authors’ experiences illustrate the balancing act at
play in the prepublication review process. Although the process
has its benefits, its procedures often seem to be loaded against
writers. This is partly because courts have done little to demarcate the boundaries of prepublication review. The Supreme
Court’s sole decision on the topic, Snepp v. United States,9 dealt
with a book published by a former CIA operative. The opinion neither identified the relevant First Amendment doctrines nor articulated the standard of review applicable to prepublication review.
Instead, the Court rested its holding—that all proceeds from
Snepp’s book would be disgorged to the government through a

2

Id. at 1–2.
Bolton I, 468 F. Supp. 3d at 3.
4
First Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 17–25.
5
See, e.g., Natasha Bertrand, ‘I’ve Had It Take Years’: Bolton’s Book Could Be Tied
Up past November, POLITICO (Jan. 29, 2020), https://perma.cc/69BB-ALNK (noting that
the prepublication review process may be drawn out when politically contentious material
is under review); Kevin Casey, Note, Till Death Do Us Part: Prepublication Review in the
Intelligence Community, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 417, 445–49 (2015).
6
Thomas Reed Willemain, A Personal Tale of Prepublication Review, LAWFARE
BLOG (Jan. 10, 2017), https://perma.cc/C5BW-CXVX.
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
444 U.S. 507 (1980) (per curiam).
3
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constructive trust—on the former agent’s breach of his fiduciary
obligation to the CIA.10
Understanding these procedures, which filter the communication between intelligence officials and the public, is critical because officials’ writings are some of the only ways that the public
gets a glimpse of the often shadowy intelligence community. An
overly burdensome prepublication review process can discourage
writings that are integral to the public’s ability to hold elected
leaders accountable for activities that the public is unable to directly witness (because these activities happen behind closed
doors or overseas).
This Comment makes two novel contributions to prepublication review scholarship. First, it identifies the standard of review
applied to prepublication review by providing a comprehensive
doctrinal review and parsing the language in Snepp. This analysis shows that prepublication review is subject to intermediate
scrutiny.11 Second, this Comment places key elements of the prepublication review process under the intermediate scrutiny microscope. Based on that analysis, this Comment argues that unclassified information cannot be censored during prepublication
review and makes a series of procedural recommendations that
courts should apply. These changes would maintain the government’s substantial interests as an employer and in national security while reining in censorship techniques that are potentially
not narrowly tailored to those interests.
Part I lays out the scope of executive authority over sensitive
information. Part I.A describes one facet of that authority, the
classification power. In particular, Part I.A focuses on retroactive
classification, the process by which the government may classify
information that was not classified when acquired. This power is
important because it allows the executive to use the classification
power reactively. That means that the power is an important failsafe but also presents opportunities for abuse. Part I.B explains
the rationale and procedures behind the prepublication review
process. Part I.C puts forward the substantive, legitimacy, and
logistical issues that arise when courts are faced with cases involving these powers. Part I.D argues that current executive authority and prepublication review jurisprudence create incentives
that lead to a suboptimal cycle in which prepublication reviewers

10
11

Id. at 510.
For an explanation of intermediate scrutiny, see infra Part II.D.
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are overcautious, favoring even remote national security risks
over speech. This pushes authors toward evasion, rendering the
review process self-defeating and creating national security risks.
Part II distills the muddled and underdeveloped prepublication review doctrine. This discussion revolves around Snepp, the
only Supreme Court case to deal directly with prepublication review. Part II outlines the three First Amendment doctrines that
intersect in Snepp: unconstitutional conditions, government employee speech, and prior restraint. That Part then argues that,
although the opinion did not explicitly articulate the standard of
review that it employed, the Snepp Court was applying intermediate scrutiny.
Part III maps out this Comment’s recommendations.
Part III.A describes why legislative solutions are less than ideal:
they are hampered by both constitutional and political concerns.
Part III.B outlines the constitutional limitations on executive actions regarding unclassified information. Part III.C charts a
course for courts through a series of adjustments to procedure that
would cabin the prepublication review process and retroactive classification power in accordance with intermediate scrutiny. These
adjustments include document-by-document review of retroactive
classification decisions that occur during the prepublication review process, flipping the burden-shifting framework to place the
onus on the government because it is in possession of the information in question, and ensuring that objections to individual
prepublication delays do not evade review through mootness.
I. EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY TO CONTROL SENSITIVE INFORMATION
This Part describes the processes at play throughout this
Comment—retroactive classification and prepublication review—
and their treatment by courts. Section A describes the classification power generally because it is a critical input in the prepublication review process itself. Section B outlines the prepublication
review process. Section C details courts’ typical treatment of
cases involving these powers. Section D takes stock of the incentive structure created by the combination of broad executive powers over information and a prepublication review process relatively untouched by courts.
A. Classification
Congress has granted the director of national intelligence
(DNI), an executive political appointee, broad authority to

2018

The University of Chicago Law Review

[88:8

maximize intelligence gathering and protect intelligence
sources.12 Pursuant to this authority, the president, vice president, agency heads, officials designated by the president, and
some delegates of their authority are empowered to shield certain
documents and information from public scrutiny.13 Executive
Order 13,526 sets out specific reasons that information can be
classified, but classification generally “shall not be considered . . .
unless [the information’s] unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause identifiable or describable damage to the
national security.”14 In addition to this content-based restriction
on what information is classifiable, there are procedural differences based on when the information is classified.
Original classification, in which the government classifies the
information upon acquisition, is the typical process. Originally
classified information is never in the public domain (the universe
of information that is generally available “to any diligent
seeker”)15 unless it is later declassified. Retroactive classification,
in contrast, describes classification of information that is already
in the public domain.
Retroactive classification comes in three forms: retroactive
original classification, reclassification, and retroactive classification of inadvertently declassified documents.16 Retroactive original classification is the original classification process applied to
information that was not classified when acquired.17 Reclassification entails classifying information that previously went through
the formal declassification process; it is the only one of the three
retroactive processes to face an additional hurdle beyond the requirements for original classification.18 Importantly, the information must be “reasonably recover[able] without bringing undue
attention to the information” in order to be reclassified.19 Classification of inadvertently declassified information does not face the
same additional hurdle because, intelligence officials argue, “the
executive order refers to information declassified and released

12

See 50 U.S.C. § 3024.
Exec. Order No. 13,526, 3 C.F.R. 298, 298–300 (2010).
14 3 C.F.R. 300.
15 United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990, 993 (W.D. Wis. 1979).
16 See Jonathan Abel, Do You Have to Keep the Government’s Secrets? Retroactively
Classified Documents, the First Amendment, and the Power to Make Secrets out of the Public Record, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1037, 1053–59 (2015).
17 See id. at 1056–58.
18 See 3 C.F.R. 302–03.
19 3 C.F.R. 302.
13
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‘under proper authority,’ so if the information was inadvertently
declassified and released, it did not become public ‘under proper
authority.’ Thus, the order’s limitations . . . do not apply.”20
Classification must be carried out pursuant to the criteria described in sections 1.1 and 1.4 of Executive Order 13,526.21 These
sections describe the necessary conditions for classifying information, such as its importance to national security, relevance to
specific subject matter, and so on.22 However, executive orders
themselves may apply retroactively.23 This means not only that
unclassified information may be retroactively classified but also
that information that was unclassifiable at the time it was acquired can be retroactively classified. Specific classification decisions can be appealed to the Interagency Security Classification
Appeals Panel, but documents undergoing prepublication review
are specifically excluded from this appeals process.24 The only
other time that the Executive Order mentions prepublication
review is to exclude documents submitted during prepublication
review from mandatory declassification review, the process by
which nearly all classified documents are required to have their
classified status reaffirmed or else be declassified.25 These exclusions are the result of the nondisclosure agreements that employees sign, which waive these procedures.
There are several formal restraints on the classification
power. For example, classification powers may not be used to
“conceal violations of law,” “prevent embarrassment,” or “delay
the release of information that does not” meet the qualifications
for classification.26 It is useful to keep in mind, though, that it is
often difficult to divine the motivations behind a classification decision.27 Indeed, despite the formal classification requirements,

20

Abel, supra note 16, at 1058 (quoting 3 C.F.R. 302–03).
3 C.F.R. 298, 300.
22 Id.
23 See Afshar v. Dep’t of State, 702 F.2d 1125, 1136–37 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (justifying
the court’s application of a classification standard promulgated as part of an executive
order that was signed while the case was on appeal by pointing to the executive’s need to
respond quickly to changing national security interests).
24 See 3 C.F.R. 298, 303.
25 See 3 C.F.R. 311–12.
26 3 C.F.R. 302.
27 Cf. GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME 75 (2004)
(pointing to the Sedition Act of 1798 to illustrate that “[s]uppressing speech because it is
dangerous to the national interest is one thing; suppressing it because it threatens a partisan interest is something else entirely. . . . [I]t is often difficult to tell the difference.”).
21
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“officials joke that ‘you could easily classify the ham sandwich.’” 28
Estimates of the number of classified documents vary greatly, but
even the lower end is in the billions.29 Of all classified documents,
“somewhere between one-half of one percent and five percent of
all classified information is in fact properly classified,” according
to a former Department of Defense official.30 With so much information already classified—often improperly—and the classified
universe constantly expanding, it has become increasingly difficult for writers on national security subjects to identify what terrain remains for them.
The classification power is enforced, at least in part, by the
threat of criminal penalties posed by the Espionage Act.31 The Act
criminalizes the knowing and willful communication (in any form,
including publication) of four categories of classified information
in a manner detrimental to the United States or beneficial to a
foreign government.32 The four categories are broad, including
“the communication intelligence activities of the United States or
any foreign government”33 and any classified information “obtained by the processes of communication intelligence.”34
B. Prepublication Review
Prepublication review generally involves the “submission of
information to an agency for the purpose of permitting such
agency to examine, alter, excise, or otherwise edit or censor such

28 Abel, supra note 16, at 1057 (quoting Telephone Interview with William J.
Bosanko, Chief Operating Officer, Nat’l Archives & Recs. Admin., Former Dir., Info. Sec.
Oversight Off. (Nov. 1, 2013)).
29 Id. at 1049 (citing Peter Galison, Removing Knowledge, 31 CRITICAL INQUIRY 229,
230–31 (2004)) (noting that experts believe the government possesses between four billion
and one trillion classified documents).
30 Susan Nevelow Mart & Tom Ginsburg, [Dis-]Informing the People’s Discretion: Judicial Deference Under the National Security Exemption of the Freedom of Information Act,
66 ADMIN. L. REV. 725, 753 (2014) (citing U.S. Government Information Policies and Practices—Security Classification Problems Involving Subsection (b)(1) of the Freedom of Information Act (Part 7): Hearings Before the Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Operations, 92d Cong. 2296 (1972) (statement of Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Albert Schweitzer
Professor of Humanities, City Univ. of N.Y.) (recounting statistics provided by William
Florence, a former Department of Defense official)).
31 Pub. L. No. 65-24, 40 Stat. 217 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18,
22, and 50 U.S.C.).
32 See 18 U.S.C. § 798(a).
33 18 U.S.C. § 798(a)(3).
34 18 U.S.C. § 798(a)(4).
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information before it is publicly disclosed.”35 Many employees
throughout the federal bureaucracy have signed contracts with
prepublication review provisions,36 but intelligence officials’ agreements are, predictably, the most demanding and controversial.37
Federal employees who work with classified information are
required to sign nondisclosure agreements that mandate prepublication review of future writings. There are two core form contracts. The first, Form 4414,38 requires that employees submit for
review “any writing . . . including a work of fiction” that could implicate “Sensitive Compartmented Information” (SCI).39 SCI “is
information about certain intelligence sources and methods . . .
pertaining to sensitive collection systems, analytical processing,
and targeting.”40 This contract applies indefinitely beyond the period of employment and requires that the author receive written
authorization before publication.41
The second agreement, Form 312, requires employees not to
disclose classified information unless they first receive official
written approval.42 This is a fairly duplicative provision given that
the Espionage Act criminally punishes identical conduct.43 What
this contract adds is the requirement that the writer seek authorization if he is “uncertain about the classification status of information.”44 This clause has been interpreted as imposing a subjective burden; if the official himself feels any uncertainty, he is

35 Federal Polygraph Limitation and Anti-Censorship Act of 1984, H.R. 4681, 98th
Cong. § 7361(6); see also Edgar v. Haines, 2 F.4th 298, 304 (4th Cir. 2021) (“Prepublication
review [ ] requires current and former employees to submit materials intended for publication to their agencies to enable the agencies to redact, in advance of publication, classified or otherwise sensitive information.” (quotation marks omitted)).
36 See, e.g., Alex Abdo, Jameel Jaffer, Meenakshi Krishnan & Ramya Krishnan, How
a New Administration—and a New Congress—Can Fix Prepublication Review: A
Roadmap for Reform, JUST SEC. (Nov. 24, 2020), https://perma.cc/K5QS-NZ38 (“[S]ubmission requirements vary considerably by agency, and they are imposed through a confusing
and sometimes conflicting tangle of contracts, regulations, and policies.”).
37 See Casey, supra note 5, at 430–51; cf. infra Part I.D (discussing former national
security officials’ avoidance of prepublication review).
38 NAT’L COUNTERINTEL. & SEC. CTR., SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION
NONDISCLOSURE AGREEMENT (2013), https://perma.cc/FMV5-FMJB.
39 Id. ¶ 4.
40 U.S. DEP’T OF COM., ACCESS TO SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION (SCI),
https://perma.cc/E6UE-ZCPW.
41 NAT’L COUNTERINTEL. & SEC. CTR., supra note 38, ¶ 4.
42 OFF. OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTEL., CLASSIFIED INFORMATION NONDISCLOSURE
AGREEMENT (2013), https://perma.cc/3FXH-KEPU.
43 See supra Part I.A.
44 OFF. OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTEL., supra note 42, ¶ 3.
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required to seek authorization.45 Seeking authorization has itself
been interpreted to convey uncertainty.46 Part I.D explores the
perverse incentives that this “certainty clause” creates.
These contracts also specify that the remedy in the event of a
breach is a constructive trust, an instrument through which all
the gains of an unauthorized work are disgorged to the government.47 The government can also seek criminal or other penalties
on top of disgorgement.48 The internal reasoning of the contract
(at least regarding the constructive trust) is that the classified
information is the property of the United States,49 so the government is entitled to seize profits from its use. Alternatively, the
confidence and “trust” that form the basis of the relationship between the employee and the government entitle the government
to recover in trust.50
Given the highly sensitive nature of information handled by
national security employees—and the accompanying propertyrights and trust theories described above—courts agree that “the
law would probably imply a secrecy agreement had there been no
formally expressed agreement” because “[c]onfidentiality inheres
in the situation and the relationship of the parties.”51 Of course,
the contracts probably make enforcement simpler and put employees on notice of their obligations. Whether imposed by contract or inherent power, determining when contractual constraints on speech become unconstitutional is a complicated
endeavor that this Comment undertakes in Part II.
Prepublication review procedures vary by agency, but the
first review is usually conducted by a prepublication review
board. The board is typically made up of officials with the proper

45 See United States v. Bolton (Bolton II), 496 F. Supp. 3d 146, 160–61 (D.D.C. 2020)
(order denying motion to dismiss).
46 See id.
47 See OFF. OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTEL., supra note 42, ¶ 5 (“I hereby assign to the
United States Government all royalties, remunerations, and emoluments that have resulted, will result or may result from any disclosure, publication, or revelation of classified
information not consistent with the terms of this Agreement.”); NAT’L COUNTERINTEL. &
SEC. CTR., supra note 38, ¶ 12 (similar).
48 OFF. OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTEL., supra note 42, ¶ 4; NAT’L COUNTERINTEL. & SEC.
CTR., supra note 38, ¶ 6.
49 OFF. OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTEL., supra note 42, ¶ 7; NAT’L COUNTERINTEL. & SEC.
CTR., supra note 38, ¶ 8.
50 See Snepp, 444 U.S. at 510–11, 511 n.6.
51 United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1316 (4th Cir. 1972); see also Snepp,
444 U.S. at 511 n.6.
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security clearances from a variety of agency divisions.52 Yet the
board goes beyond a bare search for classified information. Instead, the board is tasked with knowing “the difference between
what truly is sensitive and what is not.”53 As such, the board’s
decision-making criteria are often murky to those on the outside
because they go beyond the strictures of the classification requirements in Executive Order 13,526. Part III.B argues that the leap
from classified to sensitive information is not justifiable on national security grounds. Appeals within the agency are available
but are rarely used.54
C. Judicial Deference and Procedural Protections
From the internment of persons of Japanese descent during
World War II to the travel ban imposed on nationals from predominantly Muslim countries, courts have traditionally been reticent to question the national security justifications forwarded by
the executive branch.55 In the prepublication review context,
courts have described their deferential positions in a number of
ways—for example, “de novo with deference”56 or “presumption of
regularity”57—but the lesson is largely the same.
There are three main justifications for this practice. First,
there is a substantive concern that courts are merely unable to
determine the importance of certain information to national security—and that it is not their place to do so under the Constitution’s
separation of powers.58 Judges, as generalists, are “ill-equipped to
become sufficiently steeped in foreign intelligence matters” such
that they could understand how “[t]he significance of one item of
information may [ ] depend upon knowledge of many other items
of information.”59 Second, there are legitimacy concerns. If courts
52 See, e.g., Casey, supra note 5, at 434, 437 (describing the makeup of the CIA’s and
NSA’s prepublication review boards).
53 Id. at 441 (quoting John Hollister Hedley, Reviewing the Work of CIA Authors:
Secrets, Free Speech, and Fig Leaves, STUD. INTEL., Spring 1998, at 75, 82–83).
54 See id. at 434–35, 437; OFF. OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTEL., PRE-PUBLICATION
REVIEW—FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 3 (2020).
55 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 218 (1944); Trump v. Hawaii, 138
S. Ct. 2392, 2409 (2018). But see Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,
589 (1952).
56 E.g., McGehee v. Casey, 718 F.2d 1137, 1148 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (“We conclude that
reviewing courts should conduct a de novo review of the classification decision, while giving deference to reasoned and detailed CIA explanations of that classification decision.”).
57 E.g., Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby, 509 F.2d 1362, 1368–69 (4th Cir. 1975).
58 See Marchetti, 466 F.2d at 1318.
59 Id.
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authorized speech that led to a national security crisis, public
backlash could be immense, potentially attracting congressional
reform or simply reducing trust in the judiciary.60 Third, there are
logistical issues. Nearly all judges, clerks, lawyers, and other people who interact with the court system on a daily basis lack security clearances or other authorization to work with classified information. Court buildings are not secured in the same way as
other facilities that handle classified information. This feeds the
other two justifications; when courts cannot even see the information that is the subject of litigation, they have no choice but to
defer to those who can.61
Because courts are often unwilling or unable to informedly
question executive decision-making in this context, they instead
do what courts do best—impose procedural requirements. Perhaps the most popular is a timing requirement. Outside the national security context, the Supreme Court has subjected preapproval delays on speech to heightened scrutiny because what
looks like bureaucratic delay can just as easily be strategic footdragging that ensures that the material never attracts a large audience.62 One of the first court opinions dealing with prepublication review stated that “the maximum period for responding after
the submission of material for [prepublication review] approval
should not exceed thirty days.”63 That guideline has become part
of the SCI agreement, which promises that authors will receive “a
response” from the prepublication review authority within thirty
working days of receiving the writing.64
Yet even this basic deadline requirement is violable. Courts
consistently rule that claims for damages arising from a review
period longer than thirty days are mooted when the prepublication process is completed by the time litigation ends.65 In United
States v. Bolton (Bolton II),66 the court found that the thirty-day
deadline was met even when the government backtracked, after

60

See Mart & Ginsburg, supra note 30, at 748.
This is not to say that courts never deal with classified information. See, e.g., infra
text accompanying notes 202–04 (discussing FISA courts). For example, the Classified
Information Procedures Act, 18 U.S.C. app. 3, prescribes security procedures when a criminal trial involves classified information. See 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 9.
62 See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58–59 (1965).
63 Marchetti, 466 F.2d at 1317.
64 NAT’L COUNTERINTEL. & SEC. CTR., supra note 38, ¶ 5.
65 See, e.g., Stillman v. CIA (Stillman II), 517 F. Supp. 2d 32, 36 (D.D.C. 2007);
Boening v. CIA, 579 F. Supp. 2d 166, 172 (D.D.C. 2008).
66 496 F. Supp. 3d 146 (D.D.C. 2020).
61
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the deadline, on its initial finding that the work did not contain
classified information.67 The court determined that the deadline
had been met because Bolton received an “initial response.”68 But
this interpretation defangs the requirement because the contracts
that Bolton signed required official written approval before he
could proceed with publication. Part III.C.3 recommends alterations to both the timing and mootness inquiries.
D. Incentives Created by Broad Executive Informational
Powers and Unchecked Prepublication Review
It is worth taking stock of the incentive structure created by
the existing executive informational powers and prepublication
review doctrine. The status quo works to the detriment of all parties by breeding risks to national security, personal livelihoods,
and fundamental liberties.
As it stands, there are perverse incentives encouraging an
author to be the first mover. If the prepublication review process
is perceived as a black hole from which no book returns, authors
might gamble by forgoing prepublication review entirely or
simply publishing before receiving final approval as long as they
are confident that their work contains no classified information.69
Because the certainty clause in Form 312—which requires that
an author seek official approval whenever she is uncertain about
the classification status of something she is writing about—has
been interpreted to be a subjective requirement,70 an author
might be able to plausibly plead that she was sure that her work
did not contain classified information. Indeed, Bolton might have
been better off had he not sought approval at all because doing so
was interpreted as conveying his own uncertainty, creating
potential criminal and contractual implications about his state of
mind.
One other workaround would be for potential authors to become leakers instead. This is slightly different insofar as the author would no longer be lending credibility to the speech by
67 See id. at 157; Bolton I, 468 F. Supp. 3d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2020) (order denying temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction).
68 Bolton II, 496 F. Supp. 3d at 157.
69 See, e.g., Casey, supra note 5, at 448; Bolton I, 468 F. Supp. 3d at 3; Greg Miller,
Panetta Clashed with CIA over Memoir, Tested Agency Review Process, WASH. POST (Oct. 21,
2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/panetta-clashed-with-cia
-over-memoir-tested-agency-review-process/2014/10/21/6e6a733a-5926-11e4-b812
-38518ae74c67_story.html.
70 See supra text accompanying notes 44–46.
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stamping her name on it.71 Much of that loss in credibility is made
up by going through an outlet like the New York Times, as in New
York Times Co. v. United States (The Pentagon Papers Case).72
Furthermore, the line between leaker and whistleblower—a
designation that comes with its own protections—can be blurry.73
Regardless of its enforcement options, the government surely
does not want to set up a system that incentivizes leaking.74
That said, the risks that an author incurs by evading prepublication review are extremely high. There are potential criminal
penalties as well as the near guarantee that a court will impose a
constructive trust. Even if authors would be willing to take the
risk to raise their public profiles or because they believe that publishing their work is in the public interest, publishers may not be
so keen. The prospect of being sucked into the prepublication void,
deprived of financial returns, or subjected to criminal penalties
could strongly disincentivize publishers from working with former national security officials. That would deprive the public of a
valuable source of information.
Of course, there are still impactful works published by former
intelligence officials published each year,75 and it is difficult to
prove that there could have been more if not for prepublication
review. In all likelihood, the John Boltons and Hillary Clintons of
the world will continue to publish notable work in the face of the
prepublication review process. It is those on the margin of the decision whether to write—because they are uncertain about the
classification status of some information, because they are unable
to create a media fuss when their work is rejected by prepublication reviewers, or because of any number of other reasons—who
might forgo writing, despite being the ones who might be able to
tell readers the most about the day-to-day operations of the national security apparatus. That allows national security discourse
to be even more elite driven in a country that is increasingly

71

See Knopf, 509 F.2d at 1370–71.
403 U.S. 713 (1971).
73 See, e.g., Brittany Gibson, All the President’s Whistleblowers, AM. PROSPECT (Oct.
18, 2019), https://perma.cc/QK5U-SRL7.
74 Treatment of leakers involves another can of constitutional worms beyond the
scope of this Comment. For a discussion of the topic, see generally Heidi Kitrosser, Free
Speech Aboard the Leaky Ship of State: Calibrating First Amendment Protections for Leakers of Classified Information, 6 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 409 (2013).
75 See, e.g., Jeff Stein, Four Books About the C.I.A.’s Exploits and Secrets, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 29, 2019), https://perma.cc/V5K7-XQDG.
72
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skeptical of elites.76 A more prosaic view of intelligence work
might restore trust,77 but it is discouraged by existing prepublication review procedures.
Returning to evasion, even if authors evade the process, the
government has demonstrated little appetite for criminal prosecutions. The government has never sought to criminally prosecute
someone who violated the prepublication review process, even if
their work might have included classified information.78 It is easy
to see why when one considers the optics of appearing to jail political dissidents. Courts tend to have the same immediate reaction. In United States v. Bolton (Bolton I),79 the court expressed
incredulity when it denied the government’s request for an injunction: “For reasons that hardly need to be stated, the Court
will not order a nationwide seizure and destruction of a political
memoir.”80
This further reveals why prepublication review is more problematic than ex post enforcement mechanisms like firings or
criminal prosecutions. Not only does it implicate prior restraint
doctrine, but it avoids a sticky political accountability problem.
Instead of pursuing controversial criminal penalties after the
speech in a way that the Framers might have recognized,81 the
government is able to avoid high-profile public scrutiny through
civil suits that do not attract the same ire.
II. CLARIFYING THE SUPREME COURT’S PREPUBLICATION REVIEW
JURISPRUDENCE
Because courts say so little about national security law—and
what they do say is so deferential—many questions involving prepublication review have jumbled or inchoate answers. This Part
aims to contribute to the literature by elucidating the standard of
review applied in Snepp—the foundational Supreme Court case
on prepublication review—to clarify the doctrine that guides the
use of the powers described in Part I. Although the Court did not
76 See Kurt Andersen, How America Lost Its Mind, THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 28, 2017),
https://perma.cc/NN8Q-77RR.
77 Cf. Steven Aftergood, DNI Says Build Trust in Intelligence Through Transparency,
FED’N AM. SCIENTISTS: SECRECY NEWS (Apr. 3, 2018), https://perma.cc/M47E-AQBA.
78 See Bradley P. Moss, Will the Justice Department Prosecute John Bolton?,
LAWFARE BLOG (Sept. 25, 2020), https://perma.cc/SQV2-JAW9.
79 468 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2020) (order denying temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction).
80 Id. at 6.
81 See STONE, supra note 27, at 40–41.
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state what standard of review it was applying, this Part argues
that the case is best explained by a synthesis of the unconstitutional conditions, government employee speech, and prior restraint doctrines. Sections A, B, and C, in turn, explain each of
these doctrines and their relevance to Snepp. Section D argues
that the combination of these doctrines, on balance, led the Court
to apply a version of intermediate scrutiny.
In 1977, Frank Snepp published Decent Interval, a book
about “certain CIA activities in South Vietnam.”82 The book was
based largely on Snepp’s two tours of duty in Vietnam while working for the CIA.83 Snepp had signed an agreement similar to the
ones described in Part I.B, but he published his book without submitting it for prepublication review.84 The government did not
seek an injunction because the book had already been published.85
Instead, it sought “redress through more commonly utilized remedies”—a constructive trust on Snepp’s “ill-gotten gains.”86
In Snepp, the Court stated that “[t]he Government has a compelling interest in protecting [ ] the secrecy of information important to our national security” and that the prepublication
agreement was “a reasonable means for protecting” that interest.87 The Court ultimately upheld the district court’s decision to
impose a constructive trust on Snepp’s book because the “remedy
is the natural and customary consequence of a breach of trust.”88
The opinion’s exact holding and precedential value are unclear, however, because Snepp is characterized by muddled legal
reasoning and procedural idiosyncrasies. With regard to legal reasoning, there are two main deficiencies. First, the Court did not
address the intersecting First Amendment doctrines at issue. The
unconstitutional conditions, government employee speech, and
prior restraint doctrines are all implicated by the case, but the
Court cited none of the seminal cases on these subjects. Instead,
the Court asserted that its “cases make clear that . . . the CIA
could . . . protect substantial government interests by imposing
reasonable restrictions on employee activities that in other contexts might be protected by the First Amendment.”89 Second, the
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89

Snepp, 444 U.S. at 507.
United States v. Snepp, 456 F. Supp. 176, 178 (E.D. Va. 1978).
See Snepp, 444 U.S. at 507.
See Snepp, 456 F. Supp. at 177.
Id. at 177, 182.
Snepp, 444 U.S. at 509 n.3.
Id. at 515.
Id. at 509 n.3.
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Court did not clearly identify or categorize its standard of review.
Pinpointing a standard is difficult given the opinion’s “cavalier”90
usage of constitutional terms of art: the opinion variously describes the government’s interest as “vital,” “substantial,” and
“compelling.”91 These two problems are, of course, related. Without
identifying the standards of review in related First Amendment
doctrines, the Court had little basis to define one for the prepublication review context.
The procedural quirks of the case might have contributed to
the opinion’s underdevelopment. In addition to the dissent’s objection that the majority had answered the wrong question presented,
the Court also decided the case without the benefits of merits briefing or oral argument.92 As Archibald Cox, former solicitor general
and Watergate special prosecutor, put it at the time: “One would
have supposed that the extent of the government’s authority to
silence its officials and employees and thereby deprive the public
of access to information about government activity was not too
obvious to deserve deliberate judicial consideration.”93
Some have argued that Snepp is merely a peculiar case that
should be limited to its facts.94 This approach is misguided. First,
the cat is out of the bag: Snepp has been cited in more than two
hundred cases, including thirteen Supreme Court opinions.95 As
it stands, though, the lower courts tend to look to Snepp on an ad
hoc basis, with significant variability regarding its implications
for First Amendment law.96 Second, even if Snepp “leaves room
for fact-sensitive analyses,”97 the opinion can—and should—be
reconciled with First Amendment doctrine. Eschewing the sole
Supreme Court data point on prepublication review would leave
courts flying blind and the executive largely unencumbered.
Translating Snepp into familiar First Amendment doctrine would
provide the lower courts with a more systematic framework that
90 2 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA & NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 15:25
(3d ed. 1996).
91 Snepp, 444 U.S. at 509 n.3, 512; id. at 519 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
92 See Kitrosser, supra note 74, at 432–33.
93 Archibald Cox, Foreword: Freedom of Expression in the Burger Court, 94 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 9–10 (1980).
94 See, e.g., Kitrosser, supra note 74, at 432.
95 See, e.g., United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 465
(1995); United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 606 (1995).
96 See, e.g., Zook v. Brown, 865 F.2d 887, 890 (7th Cir. 1989); Weaver v. U.S. Info.
Agency, 87 F.3d 1429, 1439 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Edgar v. Coats, 454 F. Supp. 3d 502, 531–32
(D. Md. 2020).
97 Kitrosser, supra note 74, at 432.
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more equitably balances the interests of the government and
speakers in the prepublication review process.
This Part makes the novel argument that Snepp’s precedential value can be clarified by recognizing its position at the intersection of three First Amendment doctrines: unconstitutional conditions, government employee speech, and prior restraint.
Sections A, B, and C explain each of these doctrines and how they
are implicated in Snepp. This First Amendment soup does not automatically yield a single standard of review, but Section D argues that the countervailing concerns of each of these doctrines
help explain how the Court arrived at what is best characterized
as intermediate scrutiny.
A. Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine Slightly Favors the
Employee
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine limits the government’s power to require that someone refrain from otherwise constitutionally protected expression in order to receive a government benefit. The doctrine evolved from the rights-privilege
distinction. The rights-privilege distinction is the idea that the
government can attach whatever conditions it pleases to a government benefit because it need not provide it in the first place.98
The simple rights-privilege distinction fell by the wayside
as the role of government benefits in society grew.99 In Perry v.
Sinderman,100 the Supreme Court adopted the modern view of the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine, specifically in the free
speech context. There, the Court dealt with a state college professor who alleged that he had been terminated because of his public
criticism of the college’s administrative policies.101 Although not
necessarily required for its holding, the Court declared that “even
though the government may deny [ ] the benefit for any number
of reasons, . . . [i]t may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis
that infringes his constitutionally protected interests—especially,
his interest in freedom of speech.”102 Despite the breadth of this
statement, the scope of permissible conditions has come to be defined by something more like a balancing test than a per se rule.
98 See William W. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439, 1440, 1442–45 (1968).
99 See id. at 1461–62.
100 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
101 Id. at 594–95.
102 Id. at 597.
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While the rights-privilege bright line has been eliminated, it
is still the case that government may impose some restrictions on
constitutional rights as a condition to receive government benefits.103 When Snepp was decided, the predominant view of the doctrine was that it required courts to “balance competing public and
private concerns,”104 which many state courts characterized as a
“reasonable relationship” between the condition and the government interest.105 This standard was later refined to require that
the condition have a “nexus” with and “rough proportionality” to
the government’s legitimate interests.106 In other words, there
must be “some sort of individualized determination that the required [condition] is related both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed [private action].”107
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine has been criticized
on the grounds that it is a contentless test holding on to too much
of the rights-privileges view of state largesse.108 That may be so,
and the doctrine has branched off to more specifically address the
concerns that arise when the government aims to regulate the
speech of its own employees, which the next Section describes.
But the “reasonable relationship” framework begins to explain
the background assumptions against which the Snepp Court was
writing. The contract that Snepp signed conferred the benefit of
employment, but that does not necessarily mean that the government could include any conditions it liked. Instead, the Court
likely determined that the conditions bore a reasonable relationship—in kind and degree—to the government interests that were
advanced by the condition. Although the government employee
speech doctrine—the subject of the following Section—has developed into a standalone doctrine, it is best understood as a specific
articulation of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.

103

2 SMOLLA, supra note 90, § 7:15.
Van Alstyne, supra note 98, at 1449.
105 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 390–91 (1994) (collecting cases).
106 Id. at 386, 391.
107 Id. at 391.
108 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine Is an
Anachronism (with Particular Reference to Religion, Speech, and Abortion), 70 B.U. L.
REV. 593, 604 (1990).
104
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B. Government Employee Speech Doctrine Heavily Favors the
Government in the National Security Context
The government employee speech doctrine is essentially a
more specific articulation of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. The government employee speech doctrine was articulated
in three seminal cases: Pickering v. Board of Education,109 Connick
v. Myers,110 and Waters v. Churchill.111 Each case reinforced the
idea that the government’s power to limit employee speech is
somewhat greater than its power to limit speech based on some
other benefit and much greater than its power to limit the speech
of the public writ large.
It is also worth noting at the outset that although the government’s interests as an employer and in national security are distinct, cases involving national security employees often consolidate the analysis by framing the question as about the “efficiency”
of the employee in carrying out national security functions.112
Waters, although decided nearly fifteen years after Snepp,
provides a simple two-step balancing framework that also fairly
describes the holdings of Pickering (which predates Snepp) and
Connick. For the employee speech to be protected, it must be “on
a matter of public concern,” and “the employee’s interest in
[speaking] must not be outweighed by . . . ‘the interest of the
[s]tate, as an employer,’” in providing public services.113 This twostep approach is easier for the government to satisfy than typical
review of speech restrictions. The precision principle, which requires that the government precisely define and specifically target only the speech that it is attempting to regulate, is absent.114
The harm and causation principles are also less rigorous.115 Rather than requiring a close causal nexus between the regulated
speech and predicted harm, the Court gives “substantial weight
to government employers’ reasonable predictions of disruption.”116
While courts permit significant restrictions on employee
speech generally, the context in Snepp required an even more deferential analysis because it involved a former national security

109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116

391 U.S. 563 (1968).
461 U.S. 138 (1983).
511 U.S. 661 (1994).
Weaver, 87 F.3d at 1441.
Waters, 511 U.S. at 668 (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 142).
See 2 SMOLLA, supra note 90, § 18:8.
Id.
Waters, 511 U.S. at 673.
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official. In particular, there are two critical questions drawn from
Pickering and its progeny:117 Should the speaker be considered a
member of the general public? Are personal loyalty and confidence important requisites for the job? The first is a threshold
question; the government must show that it is restricting the
speech of its employees qua employees to be entitled to the
broader authority under this doctrine. Both questions also concern the extent of the government’s interests.
While a former employee is surely a more innocuous member
of the general public than a current one, even that innocuity is
questionable when, as a speaker, the former employee uses her
former employment status as the basis for her credibility.118 This
blurs the line between official and unofficial speech, which can
have national security consequences such as misinterpretation by
foreign leaders.119 Given that the confidentiality contracts also
carry into retirement, the government has a plausible argument
that there are certain job duties that extend beyond the period of
employment, which brings the former employees closer to the
realm of current employees, where the government has even more
authority.120
As to the second question, the case law strongly supports the
government’s need for confidence when dealing with its employees who handle confidential information.121 Furthermore, because
of the need for discipline, highly hierarchical organizations that
deal with public safety and national security are permitted even
more leeway in restricting employee speech.122
Finally, in many cases, courts consider the interest of the
public as an audience when evaluating the importance of the
speech as a counterweight to the government’s interest.123 Such a
justification is inapt in the national security context. When dealing with classified information, it is the very danger of the public
getting information of extreme importance to national security
that justifies the restriction. That is not to say that the public’s

117 See, e.g., Gustafson v. Jones, 290 F.3d 895, 909 (7th Cir. 2002) (listing seven factors
considered by the Pickering Court).
118 Cf. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby, 509 F.2d 1362, 1370 (4th Cir. 1975) (suggesting
that reports by officials are particularly credible to the public).
119 See Weaver, 87 F.3d at 1442.
120 See id.
121 See, e.g., Snepp, 444 U.S. at 510–11; United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309,
1313 (4th Cir. 1972); Knopf, 509 F.2d at 1370.
122 See 2 SMOLLA, supra note 90, § 18:7.
123 See, e.g., Pickering, 391 U.S. at 571.
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interest is unimportant, but this justification cannot advance the
analysis because as the public’s interest increases with the importance of the information, the government’s interest will usually grow in roughly equal or greater measure. The government’s
interest in national security directly concerns a public interest—
unlike, say, the government’s interest as an employer, which requires more logical inferences to reveal a public impact—further
complicating the inquiry. Relying on courts to identify the point
at which the public interest in transparency exceeds the public
interest in national security is a dangerous gambit—and one that
courts are unlikely to take up.124 Indeed, courts have highly cabined the public’s “right to know,” if the right exists at all.125
The government’s power to impose conditions on employee
speech is wide-ranging and is only made more so by the specific
considerations in the national security context discussed above.
The major factor cutting in favor of employee speech, though, is
that prepublication review resembles a system of prior restraint.
C. Prior Restraint Doctrine Favors the Employee
Noticeably absent from the Snepp majority opinion is any discussion of prepublication review in light of the Court’s prior restraint doctrine. Prior restraints are what they sound like: government rules or orders that “forbid expression before it takes
place.”126 There is a “heavy presumption” against prior restraints
under the First Amendment;127 punishment after the fact, like
that under the Espionage Act, does not face quite the same uphill
battle. Even the narrowest original conceptions of the First
Amendment were most concerned with prior restraint because it
suppresses speech generation in the first place, contrary to the
First Amendment’s general spirit of facilitating a marketplace of
ideas.128
Even though prior restraints are strongly disfavored, they
are not per se unconstitutional.129 Instead, prior restraint analysis
requires an individualized evaluation of how the restraint
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See supra Part I.C.
Marchetti, 466 F.2d at 1318–19 (Craven, J., concurring).
126 2 SMOLLA, supra note 90, § 15:1.
127 Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963).
128 Cf. STONE, supra note 27, at 40–41 (explaining that an early interpretation of the
First Amendment was that it codified an English rule forbidding prior restraints on speech
but allowed punishment for sedition after publication).
129 See Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 47–49 (1961).
125
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operates in practice.130 In Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan,131 for
example, the Court invalidated the Rhode Island Commission to
Encourage Morality in Youth, which notified the distributors of
books and magazines when the Commission found its products
“objectionable for sale, distribution or display to youths” and reported such “purveyors of obscenity” to the Attorney General.132
Although the Commission’s notices lacked the force of formal legal sanctions, the Court “look[ed] through forms to the substance”
to determine that they “sufficiently inhibit[ed] the circulation of
publications to warrant injunctive relief.”133 The scheme was held
unconstitutional because the prior restraint did not come with the
“most rigorous procedural safeguards” as “constitutionally required.”134 The Court noted that it had “tolerated such a system
only where it operated under judicial superintendence and assured an almost immediate judicial determination of the validity
of the restraint.”135 The Commission fell short because there was
no judicial review, the publisher had no opportunity for a hearing,
and both the Commission’s enabling statute and its criteria for
determining “objectionableness” were “vague and uninformative.”136
Many of the same concerns were echoed in Freedman v.
Maryland,137 which considered Maryland’s State Board of Censors,
an organization that issued licenses to show films.138 There, the
Court explained that a prior restraint is distinct from an ex post
prosecution because a prior restraint puts the initial onus on the
speaker and delays the involvement of a court.139 “And if it is made
unduly onerous, by reason of delay or otherwise, to seek judicial
review, the censor’s determination may in practice be final.”140
Building on Bantam’s judicial review requirement, Freedman’s
contribution is to focus on the impact of delay, stating that “[a]ny
[prior] restraint . . . must [ ] be limited to preservation of the status quo for the shortest fixed period compatible with sound judicial resolution.”141
130
131
132
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See Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 441–42 (1957).
372 U.S. 58 (1963).
Id. at 59–63.
Id. at 67.
Id. at 66, 64.
Id. at 70.
Bantam, 372 U.S. at 71.
380 U.S. 51 (1965).
Id. at 52–53.
Id. at 57–58.
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These procedural critiques readily apply to prepublication review. Judicial review is hamstrung by the court’s inability to review relevant evidence.142 The DNI’s authority is derived from the
broad and arguably vague mandate to “protect intelligence
sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.”143 There is
some correspondence between the prepublication review authority and the author, but it is not much of a hearing, and authors
are usually not privy to why certain information was removed.144
Finally, the process is certainly onerous and can lead to serious
delays or complete withholding.145
As one might expect, though, this discussion is complicated
by the long shadow of national security. One of the first discussions of prior restraint doctrine’s interaction with national security came in Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson.146 There, the Court
struck down a state law that authorized “abatement” of any
“malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper.”147 In dicta,
however, the Court seemed to suggest that the circumstances
might be different if national security were implicated. As examples of “exceptional cases” that might justify prior restraint, the
Court stated that “[n]o one would question [ ] that a government
might prevent actual obstruction to its recruiting service or the
publication of the sailing dates of transports or the number and
location of troops.”148 A version of this statement was subsequently put to the test—and essentially rejected—in the Pentagon
Papers Case. There, the Court permitted the publication of a host
of documents relating to a classified Defense Department study
about American activities in Vietnam.149 Although this famous
case determined that First Amendment concerns can outweigh
national security ones, national security continues to be a relevant consideration when evaluating prior restraints.150
Beyond national security generally, there is some question
about whether prepublication review is a system of prior restraint
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See supra text accompanying notes 58–61.
50 U.S.C. § 3024(i)(1).
144 See, e.g., Willemain, supra note 6.
145 See supra Parts I.B, I.D; infra Part III.C.3.
146 283 U.S. 697 (1938). The very first discussion (although not explicitly using the
term “prior restraint”) was in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52–53 (1919).
147 Near, 283 U.S. at 701–02, 723 (quoting Act of Apr. 20, 1925, ch. 285, § 1(b), 1925
Minn. Laws 358, 358).
148 Id. at 716.
149 The Pentagon Papers Case, 403 U.S. at 714.
150 See, e.g., United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990, 995 (W.D. Wis. 1979).
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at all. Rather than enforcing the prepublication review obligation
through an injunction in Snepp, the Court opted for a constructive
trust.151 In other words, the book could be published, but the profits had to be disgorged. This was because the government was not
seeking an injunction, which would have entailed finding and destroying copies of Snepp’s book. In practice, though, either mechanism is aimed at inducing adherence with the prepublication review regime. The difference in remedial formality would seem to
be a thin distinction that the heavy presumption against prior restraint would not tolerate. Even if not, the Court also upheld the
district court’s “injunction against future violations of Snepp’s
prepublication obligation.”152
Snepp ultimately sidestepped prior restraint analysis by retreating to the freely signed contract that merely imposed prepublication review as a condition of employment. The D.C. Circuit
has characterized the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence as permitting the government’s interests as an employer to “dominate the
special concerns about prior restraints. This is especially so because Pickering can readily count those concerns in the course of
the balance.”153 Although prior restraint comes with a heavy presumption against it, that presumption is rebutted somewhat by
the national security and employment concerns presented above.
It seems that in evaluating the interaction between the contractual conditions, the government’s interest as an employer, and
the prior restraint, the Court balanced the doctrines and applied
intermediate scrutiny.
D. Intermediate Scrutiny Balances These Three Doctrines
Although the Court may not have done so in a systematic
way, Snepp seems to have mixed the above doctrines and arrived
at intermediate scrutiny. The rough proportionality of unconstitutional conditions and the Waters balancing test applied to the
government as employer require somewhat more than merely a
rational link to a legitimate government interest, which characterizes rational basis review.154 But neither standard approaches
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See 2 SMOLLA, supra note 90, § 15:25.
Snepp, 444 U.S. at 509; see also Marchetti, 466 F.2d at 1318.
153 Weaver, 87 F.3d at 1440.
154 See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487–88 (1955) (explaining that, under rational basis review, “the law need not be in every respect logically
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the demands applied to prior restraint. The heavy presumption
against prior restraint means that such restrictions are essentially subject to strict scrutiny,155 which requires that the law be
the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling interest.156
The basic contours of intermediate scrutiny in the First
Amendment context were laid out in United States v. O’Brien,157
in which David Paul O’Brien was convicted under a federal law
that criminalized destruction of a draft card; he had burned his
draft card during a public demonstration.158 The case stands for
the proposition that content-neutral restrictions on speech are
subject to intermediate scrutiny, and its multiprong test outlines
the standard for intermediate scrutiny.159 First, a court must determine whether the law serves an important or substantial government interest.160 Second, the government interest must be “unrelated to the suppression of free expression.”161 Third, the
restriction must be “no greater than is essential” to serve the government interest.162
The Court applied intermediate scrutiny in Brown v.
Glines,163 which also involved national security and speech. Snepp
was decided just a month later, and it cites Brown.164 In Brown,
the Court dealt with a soldier on a domestic base. Albert Glines,
a captain in the Air Force, was circulating a petition that he intended to send to congresspeople and the secretary of defense.165
While communication between soldiers and congresspeople was
protected by a specific act of Congress, circulating a petition
within one’s own base without the base commander’s approval violated Air Force regulations.166
Brown required that a regulation must “restrict speech no
more than is reasonably necessary to protect the substantial
correction, and that it might be thought that the particular legislative measure was a
rational way to correct it.”).
155 See Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 552–60 (1975) (describing the
narrow exceptions and procedural requirements that the Court’s doctrine requires for a
prior restraint to pass muster).
156 See Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 575 U.S. 433, 442 (2015).
157 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
158 Id. at 369–70.
159 See 2 SMOLLA, supra note 90, §§ 9:10, 9:17.
160 See O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 376–77.
161 Id. at 377.
162 Id.
163 444 U.S. 348 (1980).
164 See Snepp, 444 U.S. at 509 n.3.
165 Brown, 444 U.S. at 350–51.
166 Id.
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government interest.”167 The Court upheld the restrictions on the
soldier’s right to petition as “protect[ing] a substantial Government
interest unrelated to the suppression of free expression.”168 And
although the Court repeatedly emphasized the unique need for
discipline on an army base,169 it also clarified that its holding extended beyond that narrow context.170 Snepp seems to import this
reasoning, citing Brown for the proposition that Snepp’s contract
was valid because it imposed a “reasonable restriction[ ]” to protect “substantial government interests.”171
Lower courts have also applied Brown in prepublication disputes.172 In McGehee v. Casey,173 another former CIA agent, Ralph
McGehee, challenged the prepublication review process after the
CIA reviewers determined that parts of an article that he sought
to publish about CIA operations in El Salvador and elsewhere
were secret.174 McGehee proceeded to challenge the constitutionality of using the “secret” classification category as grounds for
censorship during prepublication review.175 Although the D.C.
Circuit began its section entitled “The Constitutional Standard
for Reviewing the Censorship Scheme” by recounting the facts
and holding of Snepp, the court ultimately looked to Brown as the
“best articulat[ion]” of the necessary relationship between the
government interest and the speech restriction.176 The court held
that censoring secret information during prepublication review
was required to—and in that case did—serve a substantial government interest while being “narrowly drawn.”177 This language
reinforces the idea that the standard of review for prepublication
review is intermediate scrutiny.
Although at least one court has described the framework in
Brown as intermediate scrutiny,178 Snepp has not received that
label.179 Yet the language in Snepp is parallel to that in O’Brien
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Id. at 355.
Id. at 354.
169 Id. at 354, 357.
170 Brown, 444 U.S. at 356 n.13.
171 Snepp, 444 U.S. at 509 n.3.
172 See, e.g., McGehee v. Casey, 718 F.2d 1137, 1142 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Zook, 865 F.2d
at 890; Weaver, 87 F.3d at 1440.
173 718 F.2d 1137 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
174 Id. at 1139.
175 Id. at 1140.
176 Id. at 1140, 1142.
177 Id. at 1143–44.
178 Weaver, 87 F.3d at 1440.
179 See id. at 1441.
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and Brown in several respects: The Snepp Court speaks explicitly
in terms of “substantial government interests.”180 The other two
O’Brien requirements—that the government restriction be unrelated to free expression and no greater than essential—are
somewhat more hidden but can be found.
For a restriction to be unrelated to suppressing speech, and
thus be subject to intermediate rather than strict scrutiny, it
must focus on the “noncommunicative aspect[s]” of the expression.181 In other words, it must not target speech based on its message or content. Defining a content-based restriction is notoriously tricky, but the Snepp Court avoided that inquiry entirely.
Because the government had conceded that Snepp’s book did not
contain any classified information,182 the Court distinguished between Snepp’s two obligations “not to divulge classified information and not to publish any information without prepublication
clearance.”183 By grounding its holding in the latter requirement,
the Court focused on the necessity of the prepublication review
regime as a whole rather than the specific contents of Snepp’s
book.184
As to the third requirement, although O’Brien’s “no greater
than is essential”185 language may sound like the requirement
associated with strict scrutiny, that cannot be right because the
Court upheld the restriction based on a substantial—rather than
compelling—government interest.186 Instead, O’Brien reveals that
the tailoring required for intermediate scrutiny can run the
gamut.187 In recent years, the Court has made clear that even in
intermediate scrutiny First Amendment cases, the restriction
“still must be ‘narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest.’” 188 But what constitutes narrow tailoring in the
speech context ranges from requiring the least restrictive means
to requiring a reasonable relationship between means and ends.189
Snepp seems to be toward the latter end of this spectrum,
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Snepp, 444 U.S. at 509 n.3.
O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 381–82.
182 Snepp, 444 U.S. at 510.
183 Id. at 508 (emphasis in original).
184 Id. at 511.
185 O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
186 Id.
187 See 2 SMOLLA, supra note 90, § 9:17.
188 McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 486 (2014) (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism,
491 U.S. 781, 796 (1989)).
189 Id. at 477, 486 (citing Ward, 491 U.S. at 791, 798).
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describing the prepublication review agreement as a “reasonable
means” for protecting the government interest.190. This is consistent with the nature of intermediate scrutiny as something of
a sliding scale. Because Snepp describes the government’s combined national security and employer interests in the prepublication review context as “compelling,” the Court required only that
the system be a reasonable means of achieving those interests.191
Although the government has significant authority under intermediate scrutiny, the looseness of the standard as well as the
lack of clear articulation in Snepp leave open the possibility of
judicial adjustment when determining how tightly the government’s means must fit its ends. Although a version of intermediate scrutiny that emphasizes the government’s interests might
tolerate a burdensome system of prepublication review, another
version that focuses on the prior restraint aspect of the system
might not. With a view to the precarity of this balance, Part III.C
suggests procedural adjustments to ensure that prepublication
review remains narrowly tailored to—or at least a “reasonable
means” of achieving—the government’s substantial national security interests.
III. APPLYING INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY TO PREPUBLICATION
REVIEW
This Part charts a course to keep prepublication review between the guardrails of intermediate scrutiny by more effectively
balancing the interests of speakers and the government. While
many scholars have recommended legislation, Section A suggests
that congressional action that substantially limits executive freedom of movement in national intelligence might be unconstitutional in light of concerns about the separation of powers and the
First Amendment. Section B then turns to the executive to apply
the standard of review identified in Part II. Despite the branch’s
broad authority in intelligence, that Section argues that the executive does not have a substantial national security interest in unclassified information. As such, unclassified information cannot
be legitimately flagged for removal during the prepublication review process. Finally, Section C identifies procedural adjustments that courts could implement to bring prepublication review—particularly when leveraging the retroactive classification
190
191

Snepp, 444 U.S. at 509 n.3.
Id.
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power—in line with intermediate scrutiny’s narrow tailoring and
substantial interest requirements. Section C.1 recommends applying a heightened standard to retroactive classification decisions made during prepublication review. Section C.2 suggests restructuring burden shifting to put the responsibility for showing
that information is classified on the government. Section C.3 argues for an exception to mootness for prepublication review
claims to give substance to review deadlines.
A. Constitutional and Political Limitations on Legislative
Action
Commentators have suggested a variety of congressional solutions, from essentially banning retroactive classification192 to
strictly controlling prepublication review procedures.193 If Executive
Order 13,526 is merely executing statutory commands, the thinking goes, then surely Congress would be able to control the executive’s actions in this realm. But this ignores the president’s constitutional authority. As long as courts agree with the president’s
justification that prepublication review is critical to manage subordinates and national security intelligence operatives, the executive will have strong arguments that such procedures are
squarely within the president’s Article II powers as commander
in chief and head of the executive branch194—even if the relevant
statutory authority is hemmed in.
In fact, there was a bill proposed nearly forty years ago that
sought to highly constrain prepublication review and similar executive restraints on intelligence officials.195 Of course, it is impossible to know exactly why the bill died in the House, but a witness at the subcommittee hearings expressed skepticism that the
Supreme Court would permit Congress to oversee the executive
in this way, given the deference frequently granted to the executive over national security affairs.196 If anything, the Court has
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See, e.g., Abel, supra note 16, at 1097.
See, e.g., Casey, supra note 5, at 452–54.
194 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1–2.
195 See Federal Polygraph Limitation and Anti-Censorship Act of 1984, H.R. 4681,
98th Cong. (1984), reprinted in H.R. REP NO. 98-961, at 4 (1984) (seeking “to ban the use
and enforcement of prepublication review requirements by Federal agencies against their
employees”).
196 See Federal Polygraph Limitation and Anti-Censorship Act: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Civ. & Const. Rights of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 21 (1984)
(statement of Michael E. Tigar, Law Professor, Univ. of Tex.). Despite this skepticism,
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become more favorable to executive power over the years, as two
recent cases dealing with executive power over subordinates197
and the president’s personal documents198 demonstrate.
In addition to separation of powers concerns, there are First
Amendment issues. The First Amendment only explicitly mentions Congress.199 Although the First Amendment has also been
applied to the other branches, some courts have described the judiciary and executive as being subject to a more “flexible approach,” not only because they are not explicitly mentioned “but
also because they lack legislative capacity to establish a pervasive
system of censorship.”200 Admittedly, there are good reasons to
doubt that Congress is better positioned than the executive to
carry out a vast censorship regime201—particularly of former executive officials. Still, this higher bar for congressional action is
yet another reason why processes that potentially interfere with
speech, like prepublication review, have long been kept in the executive branch.
Some commentators have also called on Congress to establish
specialized courts to handle prepublication disputes,202 akin to
those created by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
1978203 (FISA) to handle surveillance warrant requests. Although
potentially useful in the abstract, it seems unlikely that Congress
will have any appetite for creating additional secretive,

Tigar concluded that “restrictions on freedom of speech should [not] be tolerated because
of a guess about what the Supreme Court will do.” Id.
197 See Seila Law, LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2197 (2020) (holding that a for-cause
restriction on the president’s ability to remove an agency’s sole director violated constitutional separation of powers).
198 See Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 140 S. Ct. 2019, 2035–36 (2020) (requiring that
courts evaluate the sufficiency, tailoring, and supporting evidence of congressional purpose and burdens on the president before permitting Congress to subpoena the president
for private, unofficial documents).
199 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
200 United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1314 (4th Cir. 1972).
201 See, e.g., Terry M. Moe & Scott A. Wilson, Presidents and the Politics of Structure,
57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 15–17 (1994) (comparing the presidency’s institutional
strengths to Congress’s).
202 See, e.g., Mart & Ginsburg, supra note 30, at 752 (suggesting specialized courts as
a possible solution to overclassification); Grayson M.P. McCouch, Note, “Naming Names”:
Unauthorized Disclosure of Intelligence Agents’ Identities, 33 STAN. L. REV. 693, 711 n.95
(1981) (proposing the creation of a specialized court analogous to the U.S. Tax Court to
handle prepublication review disputes).
203 Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
50 U.S.C.).
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controversial courts in the near future—there is barely enough
political will to keep the FISA courts intact.204
None of these critiques is a death knell to legislative action.
Many proposals might still be worth pursuing as policy matters.
They will have to overcome thorny constitutional and political
problems, though, which is why this Comment emphasizes judicial decision-making.205
B. Constitutional Limits on Executive Power
Although there are substantial constitutional limits on the
legislature’s ability to constrain the executive in both the national
security and First Amendment contexts, the executive does not
have free rein. Even though the Supreme Court did not squarely
address the outer bounds of the executive’s compelling national
security interest vis-à-vis the First Amendment in Snepp, this
Section argues that the executive does not have a substantial national security interest in halting the publication of unclassified
information.
1. Snepp leaves open whether the government may censor
unclassified information during the prepublication
review process.
Snepp states that prepublication review is constitutional
even when the information under review is unclassified.206 This
relates to the Court’s more sweeping claim that
[t]he problem is to ensure in advance, and by proper procedures, that information detrimental to national interest is
not published. Without a dependable prepublication review
procedure, no intelligence agency or responsible Government
official could be assured that an employee privy to sensitive
information might not conclude on his own—innocently or
otherwise—that it should be disclosed to the world.207
This argument is closely related to the Court’s finding that
Snepp’s evasion of the prepublication review process “exposed the
classified information with which he had been entrusted to the

204 See Elizabeth McElvein, The Political Landscape of FISA Reauthorization,
LAWFARE BLOG (Feb. 25, 2020), https://perma.cc/Z823-LJ7Y.
205 See infra Part III.C.
206 See Snepp, 444 U.S. at 507.
207 Id. at 513 n.8 (emphasis in original).
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risk of disclosure.”208 Of course, by the time the case reached the
Court, there was no “risk” of disclosing classified information because the government had stipulated that Snepp’s book contained
no classified information. Viewed from an ex ante perspective,
though, the risk of disclosing classified information would surely
be higher without authors going through the prepublication review process. As such, the Court was comfortable allowing a prepublication review system that subjected more harmless speech
to regulation in order to potentially catch more harmful speech.
Whether unclassified information could be censored—not
merely subject to review—is a question with which neither the
Supreme Court nor the lower courts have fully grappled. Recall
that Snepp’s holding is based on the idea that the government has
a compelling interest in protecting national security.209 Snepp also
states that “a former intelligence agent’s publication of unreviewed material relating to intelligence activities can be detrimental to vital national interests even if the published information is unclassified.”210 Despite the breadth of this statement,
the lower courts have consistently asserted that “[t]he government has no legitimate interest in censoring unclassified materials,”211 strongly suggesting that the question was not foreclosed
by Snepp. Indeed, given the Court’s focus on maintaining the efficacy of the prepublication review process as a whole, ad hoc censorship of unclassified information could be more damaging because authors might be incentivized to evade review if they
perceive the process as broken.212
This divergence might also be explained by the perceived differences in the gestalt properties of intelligence in a particular
case and who is in a position to understand those network effects.
To the Snepp Court, the intelligence agencies, “with [their]
broader understanding of what may expose classified information
and confidential sources,” have the unique ability to determine
208

Id. at 511.
See supra text accompanying note 87; Part II.D.
210 Snepp, 444 U.S. at 511–12 (emphasis added).
211 McGehee, 718 F.2d at 1141; see also Bolton II, 496 F. Supp. 3d at 157 (“[P]republication review does not allow the government to permanently restrain a former employee
from publishing unclassified information.”); Marchetti, 466 F.2d at 1317 (“We would decline enforcement . . . to the extent that [the secrecy oath] purports to prevent disclosure
of unclassified information, for, to that extent, the oath would be in contravention of his
First Amendment rights.”).
212 See supra Part I.D; Casey, supra note 5, at 448; Jack Goldsmith & Oona Hathaway,
The Scope of the Prepublication Review Problem, and What to Do About It, LAWFARE BLOG
(Dec. 30, 2015), https://perma.cc/8JPB-GLPJ; see also supra Part III.A.
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whether information is detrimental to national security—even
when it is unclassified.213 A similar phenomenon has been described by some lower courts, though not in the context of unclassified information.214 Perhaps the most famous case of this is
United States v. Progressive, Inc.215 There, the court enjoined the
publication of an article entitled “The H-Bomb Secret: How We
Got It, Why We’re Telling It,” which assembled information necessary for building a nuclear weapon.216 Although that case is almost a caricature of equity balancing—free speech on the one
hand versus nuclear annihilation on the other—courts generally
consider even more banal threats to the confidentiality of intelligence sources to “endanger lives.”217
While the scope of the government’s authority to censor unclassified information remains a live question, the subsequent
Section argues that such censorship would not be justifiable on
national security grounds—even when multiple pieces of unclassified information are assembled to create a more sensitive work.
2. The government does not have a sufficiently substantial
national security interest to halt the publication of
unclassified information.
As the Supreme Court held in Snepp and Brown, suppressing
government employees’ speech can sometimes be justified based
on the compelling interest of national security.218 If the prepublication review system is to balance speech rights and national security in a manner that satisfies intermediate scrutiny, though,
unclassified information cannot constitute a substantial national
security interest. The retroactive classification power makes
drawing this bright line possible.219 As long as the government has
the power to classify information that it finds particularly threatening while a work is under prepublication review, there is no
national security reason to allow government to withhold information that has not been put through the classification wringer.
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Snepp, 444 U.S. at 511–12.
See, e.g., Marchetti, 466 F.2d at 1318.
215 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979).
216 See id. at 998–1000.
217 Bolton II, 496 F. Supp. 3d at 149, 159 (referring to “the classified information
about intelligence sources and methods known as sensitive compartmented information,”
including Bolton’s memoir).
218 See supra Part II.D.
219 See supra text accompanying notes 16–20.
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Determining whether the government has a national security
justification matters because Snepp’s somewhat relaxed tailoring
requirement, “reasonable means,” is based in part on the government’s compelling interest in national security. Without a compelling national security justification, the presumption against
prior restraint would probably overwhelm the government’s other
interests, meaning that the government would have to rely on
remedies after the speech (using the Espionage Act, for example)
rather than preventing its utterance. Even if the government’s
other interests as an employer (such as maintaining workplace
harmony) were found to be sufficient to justify removing some unclassified information, that removal would at least need to meet
a more demanding version of intermediate scrutiny that would
require much narrower tailoring.
When describing its own requirements, the Office of the DNI
says that unclassified information is not automatically publishable because, “[f]or example, privacy information, contractual information, or even unclassified sources and methods would likely
be sensitive and therefore not publicly releasable.”220 Yet this
loses sight of the purpose of prepublication review. Privacy and
contractual information could be sensitive for individuals—imagine credit card numbers or leaked emails—but unless there is a
strong link between that personal information and national security, there would not be a substantial national security interest in
withholding that information. Instead, it should be the job of authors and publishers to ensure that their work does not unnecessarily expose personal information. The Constitution leaves the
regulation of that kind of speech to the public. The backlash to
the WikiLeaks info dump that included personal information
demonstrates at least some of the wisdom of that approach.221
This is also a prime area to limit prior restraint in favor of ex post
punishments. There are other legal avenues, namely tort law,
that enable recovery against someone who discloses another’s
personal information in a way that causes harm.222
This analysis is complicated somewhat by the fact that censorship of this kind is, generally, “unrelated” to the suppression
220

OFF. OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTEL., supra note 54, at 2.
See Emma Grey Ellis, WikiLeaks Has Officially Lost the Moral High Ground,
WIRED (July 27, 2016), https://perma.cc/5PFS-7A5R.
222 See generally, e.g., Alicia Solow-Niederman, Beyond the Privacy Torts: Reinvigorating a Common Law Approach for Data Breaches, 127 YALE L.J.F. 614 (2018),
https://perma.cc/8JYL-UQZK (discussing privacy torts and the breach of confidentiality
tort as potential remedies to data breaches).
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of free speech, as the standard is articulated in O’Brien and
Brown.223 Although there might not be an especially substantial
government interest, the argument goes, the weightiness on the
other side is even less. There is little to no value in an author
including someone else’s sensitive personal information if it is not
pertinent to the author’s purpose. That said, the government still
does not have a substantial national security interest in suppressing the information. Again, the government might be able to assert
its interests as an employer, but those are divorced from the national security foundations of prepublication review.
Furthermore, if information of this kind is truly sensitive
enough to withhold, then it is sensitive enough to classify. Recall
the descriptions from intelligence officials in Part I.A about the
capaciousness of the classification power. Given the power to classify a broad array of sensitive information at practically any time,
there must be a counterweight that preserves some safe harbor
for speech. The liminal space between classified and sensitive information ought to be preserved for public speakers to prevent
arbitrary censorship. This is bolstered by the fact that the government retains the power to pursue criminal prosecutions after
the speech. Assuming that prepublication review is at least a level
up from ex post prosecutions—even if not subject to strict scrutiny
as a full-on prior restraint—there needs to be some reason why
after-the-fact enforcement is not enough. Some justifications
might exist, but national security cannot be one because the classification power sufficiently serves that interest.
A natural objection to this approach is that it would incentivize overclassification. Of course, just about everyone agrees that
overclassification also describes the status quo, and there are
plans in motion to reduce it.224 Additionally, the panoply of non–
national security interests and the fail-safe of retroactive classification mean that the government would still be able to protect its
informational interests without expanding original classification.
Put another way, the problem of overclassification rises and falls
largely independently of the prepublication review process.
Taking the problem of overclassification as given, prohibiting
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O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 376–77; Brown, 444 U.S. at 354.
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prepublication reviewers from censoring outside the classified realm
at least provides some bright-line check that could reassure authors.
Whether to permit suppression of unclassified information becomes especially fraught when considering censorship decisions
based solely on the assembly of multiple unclassified pieces of
information. According to Executive Order 13,526, the standard for
classifying “[c]ompilations of items of information that are individually unclassified” requires that “the compiled information reveals
an additional association or relationship” that is itself (1) classifiable and (2) not revealed by the individual pieces of information.225
In order to evaluate the threat to national security posed by
a given work and determine whether the government has a substantial interest in its suppression, one ought to evaluate the information’s marginal effects. When a work reveals previously
classified information, it provides a high value to adversaries because the value of that information was zero prior to its disclosure
(assuming that classified information is inaccessible). When a
work compiles unclassified information, however, the gain to the
adversary is not nearly as high because the work merely eliminates the cost of collecting the already public information. It can
be helpful to think of these as transaction costs. Rather than making a transaction possible by speaking into existence a new piece
of information, the author is, at best, a broker between the adversary and the information.
The Progressive court considered its decision to enjoin publication as something approaching a no-brainer because of the
sheer magnitude of the risk of nuclear proliferation.226 The marginal value of censorship in the case, however, demonstrates the
inadequacy of the government’s interest in most compilation
cases. It is difficult to imagine the middle of the Venn diagram
that includes adversaries who are technically capable of building
a nuclear weapon, willing to devote the necessary resources to its
construction, and unable to assemble a series of publicly available
documents on their own.227
225

3 C.F.R. 303.
See Progressive, 467 F. Supp. at 995 (“Faced with a stark choice between upholding
the right to continued life and the right to freedom of the press, most jurists would have
no difficulty in opting for the chance to continue to breathe and function as they work to
achieve perfect freedom of expression.”).
227 This relatively simple story is complicated by the fact that the government claimed
that the article contained information that remained classified even if it was in the public
domain. Id. at 993. That said, the government’s position was “that whether or not specific
information is ‘in the public domain’ or has been ‘declassified’ at some point is not
226
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C. Judicial Adjustments to Keep Prepublication Review Within
the Bounds of Intermediate Scrutiny
With the limits on Congress and the executive in hand, a significant role remains for courts. While judges are rightly reticent
to question national security justifications, there are many decisions within courts’ power and expertise that would alter the
basic drumbeat of litigation. One should keep in mind that the
doctrine in this area is quite limited. That has two implications:
First, it means that changes would not upset deep-seated practices. Second, changes in just one or two cases could meaningfully
alter conditions on the ground given that both the agencies and
publishers are repeat players.
Although judicial action, like legislative action, implicates
the separation of powers, the procedural adjustments recommended in this Part are distinguishable from the limits on legislative power discussed in Part III.A. The judicial changes would
be instituted to ensure that the executive is abiding by the requirements of the First Amendment (albeit, under layers of judgemade doctrine). Congress, on the other hand, would be attempting to exercise some of its own constitutional authority, which is
checked and balanced by similar or overlapping powers in the
executive. Furthermore, the recommendations below are relatively modest procedural changes that are part of the judiciary’s
unique expertise. Finally, as a practical matter, courts may
simply be less likely to view judicial exercises of power in the
name of the Constitution as violations of the separation of powers
as compared to legislative action;228 unlike with Congress, there
is essentially no one looking over the judiciary’s shoulder.
This Section recommends three changes that are basically
procedural. Because providing adequate procedural safeguards
aligns with the Court’s typical approach to prior restraints,229
courts should be comfortable implementing them. The basic purpose is to ensure that prepublication review and retroactive classification stay narrowly tailored to—or at least a reasonable
determinative” because the court should instead “analyze what the practical impact of the
prior disclosures are.” Id. Independent of whether the government was correct about its
classification arguments, the case remains a useful lens through which to evaluate what
constitutes “practical impact” and substantial interest.
228 See, e.g., Jonathan L. Entin, Separation of Powers, the Political Branches, and the
Limits of Judicial Review, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 175, 186–209, 217 n.291 (1990) (describing
cases where the Supreme Court reviewed the allocation of power between branches). But
see Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 730–31, 747–49 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).
229 See supra Part II.C.

2021]

Write Like You’re Running Out of Time

2051

means of protecting—substantial national security interests.230
First, retroactive decisions during prepublication review should
be subject to a more demanding process. Luckily, the executive
has one ready-made—document-by-document review. Second,
courts should alter the burden-shifting framework to resemble
other areas of law and to increase accountability by placing the
onus on the government because it possesses the information.
Third, courts should except prepublication review suits from
mootness based on capability of repetition. Together, these suggestions retool judicial review of prepublication review to create
somewhat more friction in the government’s decisions to censor
during prepublication review, subtly shifting the balance of power
toward authors.
1. Courts should subject retroactive classification decisions
during prepublication review to document-by-document
review.
The basic premise of this Comment is that if a speaker attempts to say something that is not classified, and then—once the
author herself has alerted the government to her intention to say
the thing—the government classifies the item, we ought to be
skeptical of the government’s decision. Yet skepticism does not
always mean invalidation. Instead, courts are well-equipped to
deal in these gray areas, attempting to balance the equities.
Helpfully, Executive Order 13,526 articulates a somewhat
heightened procedure for classification decisions made after a
Freedom of Information Act231 (FOIA) request:
Information that has not previously been disclosed to the
public under proper authority may be classified or reclassified after an agency has received a request for it under [FOIA
or a number of other means] only if such classification meets
the requirements of this order and is accomplished on a
document-by-document basis with the personal participation
or under the direction of the agency head, the deputy agency
head, or the senior agency official designated under section 5.4
of this order.232

230 For a refresher on where “narrowly tailored” and “reasonable means” are coming
from and what they mean for the intermediate scrutiny analysis, see Part II.D.
231 5 U.S.C. § 552.
232 3 C.F.R. 303.
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The reasons that different procedures would apply in this
context are highly analogous to those that apply to the prepublication review process. When a specific piece of information has
been requested by a citizen under the Acts listed in the Executive
Order, there are only a handful of avenues through which the government may say no. Classification is one of these. As such, when
the government does not want to disclose a piece of information,
there is a risk it will fall back on a procedure that is supposed to
be the exception, not the rule.
Courts could require document-by-document review for instances in which information is retroactively classified and, as
such, censored during the prepublication review process. The
court could deem the extra procedure necessary to ensure that
prepublication review remains narrowly tailored to the government’s interests. Courts have imposed similar procedural obligations in prepublication review disputes, such as the thirty-day requirement,233 right to retain counsel, and other “[r]easonable
[p]rocedures.”234
That said, this process is less than satisfying because there
is still no neutral, third-party oversight. The stricter review process here is simply applied by a higher-up with the same boss—
the president. Yet without the development of specialized courts
to overcome the logistical challenges described in Part I.C, it will
require an internal official with the necessary clearances to review the information. Each intelligence agency has an inspector
general, general counsel, and managing director who could be empowered to ensure adherence. The individual or body already
tasked with prepublication review appeals could also manage this
additional process.
This standard is no panacea, but it subtly alters incentives
by imposing costs on sloppy agency action. At the very least, the
requirement that a superior approve classification on a document-by-document basis should deter unnecessary classifications. Such review is time intensive. This would discourage both
minor, overly cautious classification decisions as well as those
that sweep in an entire book. In both instances, officials would be
incentivized to classify less—or at least more precisely—because
they would know that any retroactive decisions would be
233

See supra text accompanying notes 62–64; infra Part III.C.3.
Stillman v. Dep’t of Def. (Stillman I), 209 F. Supp. 2d 185, 217–21 (D.D.C. 2002)
(order granting in part and denying in part motion to compel access), rev’d on other
grounds sub nom. Stillman v. CIA, 319 F.3d 546 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
234
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scrutinized. Attempts to strike at the well-protected heart of the
executive’s control of national security are unlikely to get far.
Pesky procedural requirements like these, however, can impact
substantive decision-making on the margins.235
2. Courts should restructure burden shifting to put the
onus on the government because it possesses the
information.
As it stands, courts require the censored speaker to prove
that the information she seeks to publish is in the public domain.236 The D.C. Circuit noted in McGehee that “[t]he CIA cannot
reasonably bear the burden of conducting an exhaustive search to
prove that a given piece of information is not published anywhere.”237 This is undoubtedly true, but it frames the problem in
the wrong way. Classified information is not the default. As outlined in Part I.A, the executive must jump through hoops to classify information. Assuming that the information has not been formally classified, the speaker—subject to the discussion in
Part III.B—has the right to say it.
While the universe of classified information is extensive, it is
finite—unlike the constant stream of speech that enters the public domain. This is even clearer in the context of retroactive classification. If the government is attempting to classify a piece of
information now, it is conceding that it is not already in the classified universe. As such, courts ought to force the government to
first prove that the attempted speech is classified. Then, the author could attempt to prove that the information is sufficiently
public such that censorship is improper. Such a procedure would
be akin to other information-forcing rules based on who has better
access to the information, such as res ipsa loquitur in tort law.238
There are complications that accompany this approach,
though. First, courts attempting to verify that a document is
properly classified are subject to logistical problems arising from
reviewing classified information at all. As such, courts would
235 Cf. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 11 (11th prtg. Oxford Univ. Press
2008) (1930) (“You must read each substantive course, so to speak, through the spectacles
of the procedure. For what substantive law says should be means nothing except in terms
of what procedure says that you can make real.”).
236 See McGehee, 718 F.2d at 1141 n.9; Boening v. CIA, 579 F. Supp. 2d 166, 170–71
(D.D.C. 2008).
237 McGehee, 718 F.2d at 1141 n.9.
238 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 17
cmt. i (AM. L. INST. 2010).
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have to rely on internal agency procedures. Just like with the
document-by-document procedure described above, courts could at
least require some kind of document number or other identifier
that has been reviewed by the agency’s general counsel or the
like.239 Being able to link a document number to a later-declassified
document could change policy over the long term. Although this
might not present an especially satisfying remedy for the author
given the extremely long timelines associated with declassification,
it could create a paper trail so that future publishers, writers,
academics, elected officials, and courts could study how prepublication review and retroactive classification are used in practice.
A second potential problem for a change in burden shifting is
that courts have been deferential on the seemingly straightforward
question of whether something is in the public domain. This is
critical because Executive Order 13,526 requires that “the information [ ] be reasonably recover[able] without bringing undue attention to the information” in order to classify information that
has already entered the public domain.240 This is an especially
high bar to satisfy in the Internet Age.241 The recoverability limitation is only meaningful, though, if courts are comfortable determining the extent to which information has entered the public domain.
In some cases, that can be fairly easy—Bolton’s publisher had
already distributed hundreds of thousands of physical and digital
copies of his book to reviewers, booksellers, and the like.242 In Alfred
A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby,243 however, the court deferred to the CIA
on the question whether a certain piece of information was “so
widely circulated and [ ] so generally believed to be true, that confirmation by one in a position to know would add nothing to its
weight.”244 These sorts of determinations ought to be squarely
239 One worry is that the government would simply invoke the “Glomar response,” in
which the government claims that admitting whether the information exists at all is itself
a classified item. Phillippi v. CIA, 546 F.2d 1009, 1011–12 (D.C. Cir. 1976). Glomar responses are most often used in the FOIA context but would be inapt in prepublication
review cases because the source of the information is different. In a FOIA request, a member of the public is requesting a specific piece of information from the government; a
Glomar response means that the government neither confirms nor denies whether it has
such information. In prepublication review, the writer is the one forwarding a specific
piece of information and the government is flagging it based on its claim that such information is in its possession and is classified.
240 3 C.F.R. 302.
241 See Bolton I, 468 F. Supp. 3d at 6.
242 See id.
243 509 F.2d 1362 (4th Cir. 1975).
244 Id. at 1370–71. (“It is true that others may republish previously published material, but such republication by strangers to it lends no additional credence to it. [Former
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within a court’s wheelhouse. In fact, the intelligence agencies
might have a less reasonable view of whether a particular piece
of information is in the public domain because they could read too
much into a single piece of information with the entire web of
classified information in mind. Courts, on the other hand, have
no choice but to look at information only in the context of the unclassified universe. If an author can point to certain public
sources, a judge is well positioned as a generalist to determine
whether it is reasonable to think of the information as in the public domain. This would also remedy the perverse incentives created by only considering something to be in the public domain if
an author forces it there, as in Bolton.
3. Courts should give teeth to prepublication review
deadlines by finding that violations are capable of
repetition yet evade review.
As noted in Part I.C, the Supreme Court has recognized that
delay can effectively quash speech: it can deter writers from seeking to publish, derail writers and publishers along the way, or
simply make the writing untimely. As such, requirements for
timely review by prepublication review boards ought to be robustly enforced by courts. Courts have typically drawn the line at
thirty days, and the Office of the DNI has articulated that as a
guideline too.245
The problem, though, is that authors have little recourse to
challenge delays. In at least two cases, authors had their claims
under the Administrative Procedure Act246 (APA) mooted because
their prepublication reviews had been completed by the time the
district court had reached a decision.247 Both authors alleged that
the reviewing agencies had acted arbitrarily and capriciously, in
violation of the APA, by failing to issue a prepublication review
decision in a timely manner.248
intelligence officials] are quite different, for their republication of the material would lend
credence to it.”). Note that this reasoning is especially strange with respect to unclassified
information. If the former official did not have the qualifications sufficient to lend credence
to her statements, why speak at all? If this were the framework, it would seem that former
officials would only be allowed to speak on topics that they know nothing about. Surely
that cannot be what the First Amendment encourages—let alone the only thing it permits.
245 See OFF. OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTEL., supra note 54, at 3.
246 Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 5 U.S.C.).
247 See Boening, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 172; Stillman II, 517 F. Supp. 2d 32, 36 (D.D.C. 2007).
248 See Boening, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 172; Stillman II, 517 F. Supp. 2d at 36.
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Mootness is the doctrine that prevents a court from dealing
with issues that it can no longer remedy. It is closely tied to standing doctrine, which requires that the plaintiff have suffered an
injury in fact that is fairly traceable to the defendant and will be
redressed by a favorable decision.249 These doctrines exist because
Article III of the Constitution requires that courts hear only
“Cases” and “Controversies,” which courts have interpreted to
mean only live disputes.250
There are narrow exceptions to mootness, however, which
courts should apply to prepublication review litigation in order to
make timing deadlines meaningful. It would be an ironic disservice of justice to allow executive delay to slide only because the
judiciary is even slower. The relevant mootness exception here
would be that deadline violations are “capable of repetition, yet
evad[e] review.”251 In the two cases in which the claims were
mooted, the courts found that prepublication review disputes did
not meet the standard for the repetition exception, which requires
both exceptional circumstances and that a named plaintiff make
a reasonable showing that he will again be subject to the illegal
conduct.252 More succinctly, the courts determined that they could
provide “no further relief" once the agency had made a final prepublication review decision.253
The first requirement, that the situation is exceptional, can
be a slippery concept. Lawsuits involving abortion are perhaps
the most prominent examples.254 These situations are exceptional
because the circumstances giving rise to the action “exist only for
a short, fixed time period and [ ] may be over by the time the litigation” reaches the appellate stages.255 The same logic maps onto
the prepublication review process with perhaps even greater force
because the government could furtively control the pace of the

249

See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; see also, e.g., Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 &
n.7 (1969).
251 S. Pac. Terminal Co. v. Interstate Com. Comm’n, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911).
252 See Boening, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 172 (citing City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S.
95, 109 (1983)) (determining that the plaintiff’s situation failed to satisfy either requirement); see also Stillman II, 517 F. Supp. 2d at 36 (determining that the chance of future
harm was not “more-than-speculative” (quoting Clarke v. United States, 915 F.2d 699, 701
(D.C. Cir. 1990))).
253 Stillman II, 517 F. Supp. 2d at 36.
254 See Stephen Wermiel, Battling over Mootness, SCOTUSBLOG (Aug. 29, 2019),
https://perma.cc/FG97-WJYZ.
255 Id.
250
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prepublication review in accordance with the pace of litigation.256
Constitutional concerns are also implicated in both contexts—
Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process there257 and
First Amendment speech here.
The second requirement, that a named plaintiff make a reasonable showing of potential for repeat harm, would also be met
as long as the plaintiff plans to write more than one piece on the
same subject of dispute. Much of the plaintiff’s writing is presumably going to be on her area of expertise, and even if she might not
write multiple treatises on the subject, op-eds and other writings
are also within the ambit of prepublication review. Speedy review
of multiple pieces is particularly important when the time window in which the plaintiff’s knowledge is pertinent to public discourse is narrow, as often happens with national security topics.
In sum, the court would be providing relief insofar as it would be
laying out the requirements for future prepublication reviews.
Although this might normally sound in the register of advisory
opinions, the exception outlined in this Section provides an outlet
to avoid mootness and provide prospective relief.
Still, courts are understandably uncomfortable with holding
prepublication review boards to strict deadlines for fear that rushing the process might let some critical piece of information slip
through the cracks. Indeed, there is a delay built into Executive
Order 13,526 to deal with this possibility and bolster retroactive
classification. The Order requires officials who are not vested
with classification authority to notify those who are when the officials come across information that they believe should be classified.258 This provision requires this classification decision alone to
be made within thirty days,259 and then the work must still

256 That the government controls the pace of review might make the completion of
prepublication review while litigation is pending look more like the “voluntary cessation”
exception to mootness than capability of repetition. See County of Los Angeles v. Davis,
440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979) (quoting United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632
(1953)). Voluntary cessation requires that there is no reasonable expectation that the issue
will recur and that the cessation of the activity completely resolves the controversy. See
id. The core difference between voluntary cessation and capability of repetition is that the
former requires some action by at least one of the parties. If it were clear that the government were deliberately completing the prepublication review in order to moot the litigation, it would probably fall under voluntary cessation. From the outside, though, it appears
that prepublication reviews simply come to a natural end during litigation. Either way, it
would be excepted from mootness.
257 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973).
258 See 3 C.F.R. 300.
259 See 3 C.F.R. 300.
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progress through the rest of the prepublication review process.
Instead, prepublication review boards should be vested with original classification authority as long as any retroactive decisions
are reviewed according to the procedure outlined in Part III.C.1.
Collapsing these bureaucratic layers should expedite the process.
CONCLUSION
Courts and commentators have recognized the tension between national security and free speech since the Founding, but
national security has gained significant territory at the expense
of speech in recent decades. The executive has obtained broad authority over national intelligence information, including the classification and prepublication review powers. The judiciary is
nearly always deferential to these judgments—and for good reason. Logistical and constitutional constraints on the judiciary
leave it little choice but to defer to the executive. That said, this
Comment has outlined ways in which the judiciary can bring the
prepublication review process into a more equitable balance with
First Amendment speech protections in order to satisfy intermediate scrutiny—particularly when the unique risks of retroactive
classification are involved.
Although Snepp (the Supreme Court’s sole case on prepublication review) is abstruse, the standard of review essentially resembles intermediate scrutiny. Extensive powers combined with
a fairly flexible standard of review incentivize behavior that is
inimical to the goals of all parties. Unfortunately, Congress has
not shown interest in this area for over three decades; even if it
were so inclined, the degree to which it could constitutionally intervene is unclear. That is not to say executive power is unbounded—the branch should at least be unable to censor unclassified information based on national security justifications.
Navigating the underdeveloped doctrine, courts have an important role to play in erecting procedural guardrails to narrowly
tailor executive authority to substantial interests, as required by
intermediate scrutiny. Courts ought to ensure that retroactive
classification is not frictionless and that the prepublication review process proceeds according to clear rules. These include document-by-document review of retroactive classification decisions
during prepublication review, restructuring burden shifting for
determining whether information is in the public domain, and excepting prepublication review litigation from mootness.

